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marKus Lammenranta
HOW ART TEACHES: A LESSON FROM GOODMAN
ABSTRACT 
It is often thought that art teaches us and that we can learn from it. To 
learn that p is to come to know that p. So, art can teach us only if we can 
gain knowledge through art. How is this possible? Nelson Goodman 
tries to explain it by his theory of symbols. However, his theory just 
explains how works of art can refer to the world, and referring to the 
world is not enough for having knowledge about the world. Because 
knowledge is a matter of having true beliefs, in order to give us 
knowledge, works of art must say something that is true. It is argued 
that we can explain how they can do this, if we revise and supplement 
certain aspects of Goodman’s theory of symbols. Furthermore, we can 
even explain how our built and natural environment can teach us. 
INTRODUCTION
Artists typically think that they are doing research. They study the world and want to say something about it through their art. For example, in a recent documentary,1 Martin Scorsese was asked 
why Woody Allen has made so many movies. He answered: “Because he 
has so much to say.” One hears this sort of statement every day—even from 
abstract artists. They think they do research, study reality. If this is what 
artists do—if they say things through their art—then at least sometimes 
what they say is true, and we can know that it is true. So, art can teach us, 
and we can learn from it. We can attain knowledge through art.
Sometimes, philosophers seem to concur with this view, even 
enthusiastically, as Nelson Goodman does: 
1 Woody Allen: A Documentary – Manhattan, Movies & Me (2012), directed by Robert B. Weide.
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[T]he arts must be taken no less seriously than the sciences 
as modes of discovery, creation and enlargement of knowledge in 
the broad sense of advancement of the understanding. 
(Goodman 1978, 102.)
However, it is very difficult to explain how art can advance knowledge. 
For example, Goodman is forced to concede that it is not knowledge in its 
ordinary sense that he has in mind but understanding. I think we should 
not yet give up. Indeed, we can learn from Goodman how art can give us 
quite ordinary propositional knowledge if we make some changes in his 
view. 
Goodman’s attempt to explain how art can teach consists of three steps: 
The first is to explain how works of art can refer to the world, how they 
can work as symbols. Goodman does this in his influential book Languages 
of Art (1968). In this work, he provides a general theory of symbols and 
explains how works of art can refer in terms of it. It seems clear that they 
must refer to the world to give knowledge about it. 
He takes the second step in Ways of Worldmaking (1978), where he 
considers all uses of symbols—in art, science and everyday perceptions—
and argues that all our access to the world comes through the use of 
symbols, and that symbols are not devices for describing the world waiting 
to be discovered, but ways of making the worlds referred to. There is no 
ready-made world that exists independently of our ways of describing 
it. We make the world when we correctly describe it through symbols. 
Furthermore, because there are alternative and incompatible ways of doing 
this, there are many worlds if any, says Goodman. 
The third step, which he takes in his book with Catherine Elgin 
Reconceptions in Philosophy & Other Arts & Sciences (1988), is to replace our 
ordinary concept of knowledge with the broader concept of understanding. 
The problem with our ordinary concept of knowledge is that it applies 
only to declarative sentences that can be used to say something about the 
world, something that is true. The concept of understanding is supposed to 
cover also non-declarative uses of symbols—symbols that refer but do not 
say anything and therefore lack truth-value. So, because the scope of the 
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ordinary concept of knowledge is so narrow, we need the wider concept of 
understanding to explain the cognitive significance of all uses of symbols.
I think that the second and third steps are unnecessary, and it is best to 
avoid them. We can be realists and monists and believe that there is only 
one world that exists largely independently of us, and that art can give us 
knowledge about it in its quite ordinary sense. We can avoid these steps if 
we revise and supplement certain aspects of Goodman’s theory of symbols. 
I 
GOODMAN’S THEORY OF SYMBOLS: THE BASICS
Goodman’s theory has only two primitive (undefined) terms: “reference” and “denotation”. The term “symbol” is defined in terms of reference: 
A is a symbol for B if and only if A refers to B.2
An important type of reference is denotation. Denotation is illuminated 
by giving examples of it. The paradigm examples are singular terms and 
predicates of ordinary language: Proper name and singular term “Johnny 
Depp” denotes Johnny Depp. Predicate “tiger” denotes tigers. And predicate 
“red” denotes red things.
Goodman (1968, 3–19) argues that pictorial representation or depiction 
is a form of denotation. It is not a matter of resemblance or imitation. 
Pictures do not copy the world. They are symbols that denote their 
subjects. He thinks also that a picture can work, like a proper name, and 
denote uniquely one particular thing. For example, the picture of Johnny 
Depp denotes Johnny Depp. But he also thinks that a picture can work, 
like a predicate, and denote multiply each of a whole group of objects. For 
example, the picture of a tiger in a dictionary denotes all tigers. 
Symbols belong to a symbol system, which connects the symbols of the 
2 There are symbols that do not refer, such as letters, syncategorematic terms and symbols in 
fiction. In their case, we use the word “symbol” as a one-place predicate. This is a derivative 
use of the term, because even these symbols belong to symbol systems that have a referring 
function.
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system with their referents (objects referred to). When we know the system, 
we know what its symbols refer to. Goodman takes symbol systems to be 
kinds of conventions. They are based on our practices of using symbols of 
different kinds. For example, styles in the visual arts, such as impressionism, 
realism and cubism, are examples of pictorial symbol systems (Goodman 
1968, 127–173).
II 
EXEMPLIFICATION
A great innovation of Languages of Art is its explanation of how purely abstract works, such as abstract paintings and pieces of instrumental music, can refer and thus symbolize. Goodman calls 
this symbolic function exemplification (Goodman 1968, 45–95).
Because abstract works represent nothing, it is their own properties 
that are important. Goodman’s idea is that these works refer to their own 
properties. They exemplify their properties. The idea is not trivial, because 
objects do not exemplify all their properties.
As an example of exemplification, Goodman (1968, 53–54) gives a 
sample in a tailor’s sample book. It exemplifies color, weave, texture and 
pattern but not size, shape or weight. In the same way, an abstract painting 
exemplifies forms, colors, structures and feelings but not weight or value. It 
only exemplifies properties that are important to it as a work of art.
As a nominalist, Goodman (1968, 54–57) thinks that strictly speaking 
there are no properties. So, in careful language, we must replace the talk of 
properties with the talk of predicates or other denoting symbols, which he 
calls labels. We can therefore define exemplification in terms of denotation 
and reference.
A exemplifies label B if and only if B denotes A and A refers to B.
For example, instead of exemplifying the property of blueness, a painting 
exemplifies the predicate “blue” that denotes it. Or, if the painting is sad, 
it exemplifies the predicate “sad” that denotes it. Of course, the predicate 
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“sad” cannot denote a painting literally. A painting is a physical object that 
lacks feelings, yet it can be metaphorically sad. The predicate “sad” denotes 
paintings and other works of art metaphorically. When a painting exemplifies 
the predicate “sad” metaphorically, Goodman (1968, 85–95) says that it 
expresses sadness. Expression is a matter of metaphorical exemplification. 
There are also complex referential relations that consists of steps of 
denotation and exemplification. For example, when a painting exemplifies 
the predicates “blue” and “sad” that, in turn, denote other blue and sad 
things in the world, the painting indirectly refers to those things. Therefore, 
even abstract works that represent nothing can refer to things outside them 
and contribute to worldmaking (Goodman 1984, 61–63).
III 
KNOWLEDGE AND SYMBOLS
Now we can understand why Goodman wants to replace our ordi-nary concept of knowledge with the concept of understanding. Knowledge—in its ordinary sense—is a propositional attitude. It 
has a propositional content that is expressed by a that-clause. For example, 
I know that it is summer. I know that we are in Helsinki. “That it is summer” 
and “that we are in Helsinki” express propositions or thoughts (as Frege 
called them). Let’s assume that S stands for a person and p stands for a 
proposition. We get the following definition.
S knows that p if and only if 
S believes that p,
p is true and
x (justification, reliability, sensitivity, safety or . . .)
There is a debate about x—the condition that converts true belief into 
knowledge—among epistemologists, but we need not worry about that. 
We can just assume that, if the first two conditions are satisfied, the third 
condition is often satisfied as well. If art can give us true beliefs, it can most 
likely give us knowledge as well. 
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According to Goodman, works of art refer to the world, but they do 
not say anything true about the world. What is said is a proposition. Some 
works of art do not express propositions or thoughts about the world: 
Pictures, abstract paintings and musical works do not have propositional 
contents at all. Though fictional literary works have propositional contents, 
their contents are false according to Goodman (1984, 123–126), because there 
are no fictional entities. So, art cannot give knowledge, because it does not 
give us true propositions that are necessary for knowledge.
A further problem is that Goodman (1972, 221–238) does not accept 
propositions at all. They are abstract and intensional entities that 
he does not accept into his worlds. For him knowledge is an attitude 
toward declarative sentences or statements rather than to the contents of 
sentences—propositions. The scope of knowledge is therefore restricted to 
what can be articulated in language, which already rules out visual arts and 
music as sources of knowledge.
Goodman’s (1988, 153–166) move is to suggest that the concept of 
knowledge should be replaced with the broader concept of understanding 
and to argue that merely referring, non-declarative, symbols can advance 
understanding. As I said, we should avoid this move.3 The problem is not in 
our concept of knowledge. It is part of Goodman’s philosophical program, 
which does not allow propositions. If we can appeal to the existence of 
propositions, we can explain how art of all kinds can express propositions 
and say something and advance knowledge. Propositions, unlike sentences, 
are non-linguistic. So, also nonverbal symbols, in visual arts and music, can 
in principle express propositions. We just need one further move.
3 It may also be useless, because understanding appears to be a propositional attitude as well. 
For example, I understand why John is angry. Anyway, Goodman does not provide sufficient 
explication of his concept of understanding.
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IV 
DIRECT REFERENCE 
AND SINGULAR PROPOSITIONS
John Hawthorne and David Manley write in their Reference Book (2012, 4): “The discovery of the twin categories of [direct] reference and singular thought [proposition] is widely felt to be one of the 
landmark achievements of twentieth-century analytic philosophy.” Both 
categories derive from Bertrand Russell’s philosophy, and they are widely 
accepted in current philosophy of language. The problem of Goodman’s 
project is that it rejects both categories. I suggest that we follow Russell 
and contemporary philosophers of language and add an account of 
direct reference to Goodman’s theory of symbols and that we also accept 
propositions, properties and relations. Then we can explain how all art can 
express propositions and thus advance propositional knowledge.
The Russellian idea is quite intuitive. The content of a sentence is a 
proposition. This is what we say or assert when we utter the sentence. The 
content of a proper name is the object it refers to. Its semantic role is simply 
to pick out the object we want to talk about. So, this is what it brings to the 
content of a sentence. The content of a predicate is a property or relation it 
expresses. The role of a predicate is to express what we say about the object—
what properties we attribute to it. This is what it brings to the proposition. 
Thus, a singular (Russellian) proposition consists of objects and properties or 
relations. For example, the sentence “John is tall” expresses the proposition 
that John is tall, which consists of John and the property of tallness. The 
sentence “John loves Mary” expresses the proposition that John loves Mary, 
which consists of John, Mary and the loving-relation.
Russell (1956, 201) thought that only demonstrative pronouns “this” 
and “that” are genuine proper names (or singular terms). Contemporary 
philosophers of language typically take directly referring expressions to 
include also ordinary proper names, like “John” and “Mary”, and indexicals, 
such as “here”, “now”, “you”, “I”, “he”, and “she”. (What indexicals refer to 
depend on the context, in which they are used). 
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There is a dispute about what direct reference is based on. Russell (1956, 
201) thought that it is based on direct awareness of the object referred to. 
Saul Kripke (1980) thinks that there must be a causal or historical connection 
between the object and our use of the term. At least, when it comes to art, 
we can be rather liberal: it is something in the context, in which we use 
the symbol, that determines the referred object—perhaps it is some causal 
relation to the object or just our intention to refer to it. So, in order to know 
what a symbol refers to, it is not enough to know the linguistic conventions 
or the symbol system, as Goodman thinks. We must also know the context, 
in which the term or symbol is used.
We can now see that propositions are non-linguistic: they consist of 
real objects and properties or relations that are bound together. So other 
symbols than sentences can in principle express propositions and thus 
say something.4 This is possible, if we could just find the semantic roles of 
singular terms and predicates in the symbols. I think we can.
V 
THE PROPOSITIONAL CONTENTS OF PICTURES 
AND ABSTRACT WORKS
Because propositions are non-linguistic, there is no problem for non-verbal symbols, such as pictures and samples, to express propositions and to say something about their objects. Instead of Goodman’s 
single symbolic function, denotation, we just need a double function: 
each symbol must both pick out an object and attribute properties to it 
(both refer to an object and describe or characterize it). Then the referred 
object and attributed properties constitute the proposition that the symbol 
expresses. I think that our ordinary practice of using symbols supports this 
view of their content.
4 This is true even if propositions are understood as sets of possible worlds rather than 
Russellian structured entities. See, for example, Lycan (2008, 126–129).
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Suppose there is a photograph of one of two identical twins. Nobody can 
distinguish the twins from each other just by looking. Which of them does 
the photograph depict? It seems that Goodman would have to say that it 
denotes both, because both have the properties that the photo attributes to 
its object (or, in Goodman’s words, both are denoted by the photo according 
to the relevant symbol system). This cannot be right. Of course, we say that 
the photo is only of one of them, the twin whom it is taken of. It is of the 
one who was present when the photo was taken and reflected the light 
that went through the lens of the camera. We must therefore distinguish 
between the object that the photo directly refers to and what the photo tells 
or shows about that object. So, we have here the double symbolic function 
of referring and describing that determines the proposition expressed by 
the photo. It is the causal relation to the object that determines the referent.
With paintings, things are somewhat different. It may be plausible that a 
portrait refers to the person who sat for the artist and tells something about 
her. However, the object (or subject) of a painting is not always the sitter. For 
example, an artist may use a prostitute as a sitter for a painting about Virgin 
Mary. Yet, the painting represents Virgin Mary rather than the prostitute. 
It seems that here it is the artist’s intention that determines the depicted 
object. Typically, this is also disclosed in the title of the work. Once again, 
we have the double function of picking out an object and saying something 
about it and thus a proposition expressed. 
A picture, like a sentence, can therefore have a propositional content. The 
content is just much more complex and fine-grained than the content of a 
sentence. The number of properties that a picture attributes to the subject 
is huge, and we cannot completely express them in words. We simply lack 
words for all those properties. A picture is worth of thousand words.
The same is true of samples–Goodman’s exemplifying symbols. For 
example, swatches of cloth in a tailor’s sample book do not just exemplify 
certain of their own properties. They also refer to the ready suit and say 
that it will have those properties. This is the whole point of the sample. It 
gives information about the suit that does not yet exist.
Also, abstract works of art can express propositions. It is just required 
that they somehow pick out objects, to which they attribute the properties 
72
they exemplify. Sometimes the title of the work discloses the object. 
Sometimes artists themselves tell us what their works are about. For 
example, Dmitri Shostakovich tells that all his symphonies beginning from 
the fourth are about Soviet life under the rule of Stalin (Volkov 2004).5 Even 
purely instrumental music can exemplify feelings and other properties that 
it attributes to an object. It can express propositions, which once again are 
hard or impossible to express in words or in any other way.
So, pictures and even abstract works can express propositions and 
advance our knowledge about the world. However, there is a problem. 
Works of art, not only in literature but also in other arts, are typically 
fictional. There are no objects referred to, because there really are no 
fictional entities, such as Sherlock Holmes or Anna Karenina. Neither are 
typical abstract works thought to refer to anything: the artist gives no hints 
about the referred object; neither do the receivers look for it. I have two 
solutions to these problems: First, the use of a symbol that expresses an 
incomplete or false proposition can pragmatically implicate a proposition 
that is true. Second, abstract works that do not refer to the world outside of 
them can refer to and say something about themselves.
VI 
FICTION
Because there are no fictional entities, fictional names are empty or meaningless and fictional sentences (and pictures) do not express complete propositions. A part of the proposition, the object referred 
to, is missing. Fictional sentences say nothing; they are neither true nor 
false. This is a problem, if we think that fiction can teach us something 
about the real world.
Kendall Walton (1990) suggests a solution. By using fictional sentences, 
we do not really say anything, but we pretend to say something. Fiction is a 
5 I don’t deny that we can listen to those symphonies without knowing this and without taking 
them to say anything about matters outside music. See below!
73
matter of make-believe. However, this solution does not yet answer our core 
question: How can fictional works say anything about the real world? I think 
they do tell about the world. They just do not say it directly or literally. They 
pragmatically imply or implicate it. This is a common feature of ordinary 
language. Suppose somebody asks me about my student Tom, whether he is 
good in philosophy, and I reply: “He has a nice handwriting.” Even if I don’t 
say it literally, I implicate that he is not good in philosophy (Grice 1989, 22–40). 
Not only true sentences–or the utterances of these sentences–can 
pragmatically implicate something. Uttering a false sentence can implicate 
something that is true. Metaphors are like this. They are literally false, but can 
implicate something true. For example, if I say, “My love is a rose”, I literally 
say something that is false. My love is not a plant. But this is not what I want 
to convey to you. I want to inform you about some of her characteristics. 
If a false sentence can be used to pragmatically implicate something 
that is true, so can sentences, by which we pretend to say something and 
which lack a truth-value. Though fictional sentences and pictures do not 
literally say anything, they can pragmatically implicate something that is 
true about the real world.
The Bible gives a nice example of this: King David saw beautiful 
Bathsheba, send for her, slept with her, and made her pregnant. After 
failing to get her husband, Uriah, to think he was the father of the child, 
David arranged for Uriah to be killed. Then the prophet Nathan came to 
David and told the following story about a rich man and a poor man:
The rich man had many flocks and herds; the poor man had 
only one lamb, which grew up with his children, ate at his table, 
lay at his bosom and was like a daughter to him. The rich man had 
an unexpected quest. Instead of slaughtering one of his own sheep, 
he slaughtered the poor man’s only lamb and served it to his guest.
King David exploded in anger: “The man who did this deserves to die!” 
Then Nathan turned to David, pointed to him and declared: “You are that 
man!”6
6 This version of the story is from Alvin Plantinga (2000, 452) who uses it for a different purpose.
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This is a fictional, make-believe, story, but it is supposed to tell or 
implicate some truths about David. It does not explicitly say what those 
truths or propositions are. Perhaps, it is something obvious (that David did 
something morally wrong). Perhaps, it is difficult or impossible to put into 
exact words. Anyway, the story tells David something about him: it conveys a 
singular proposition about him (perhaps a moral proposition). He attains new 
knowledge about himself. Fiction is here used as a source of self-knowledge. 
This is surely an important kind of knowledge that fiction can give us.
The story also illustrates the fact that what fiction implicates is context-
sensitive. To somebody else, the story may tell something different—
perhaps some general propositions about rich people and poor people or 
about life generally. Aristotle thought so. He said in Poetics: “Poetry is more 
philosophical and more elevated than history, since poetry relates more of 
the universal, while history relates particulars” (Aristotle 1995, 1451b).
People have a strong tendency to generalize on the basis of a few 
particular cases, perhaps just one. Some psychologists and philosophers 
take this tendency to be irrational, but if nature works in a law-like manner, 
this way of forming beliefs may very well be quite rational and reliable 
(Kornblith 1993, 87–96). This tendency extends to merely imagined cases 
and explains how and why we can learn not just singular but general truths 
from fiction. It is equally important that fiction can give counterexamples 
to generalization and prejudices that we already have. Fiction advances 
knowledge also by correcting our mistakes.
VII 
LEARNING FROM ABSTRACT WORKS AND ENVIRONMENT
It is true that many abstract works—paintings, pieces of music and buildings—are not thought to refer. Goodman says that also these works refer by exemplifying their own properties. This is true, if 
exemplification is a form of referring, but this does not explain how such 
works can say something. However, it is quite natural to understand these 
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sorts of exemplifications as a form of saying. We interpret these works as 
referring to themselves and saying that they have these properties. For 
example, sad music does not just refer to sadness; it says that it is sad. Of 
course, the properties need not be so obvious as sadness. They can be very 
complex and delicate, and it can require expertise to detect them.
So, some works of art teach us something about themselves. We learn 
that they have certain properties. This can hardly be denied, but does 
this not trivialize the idea that art teaches or advances knowledge? It does 
not, if the truths that art teaches are important. A work of art does not say 
about all its properties that it has them. It only says this about some of its 
properties—the important ones. 
To Monroe Beardsley’s criticism that the whole idea of exemplification 
might be dropped without loss, that mere possession of properties is all 
that matters, Goodman gives the following response: 
Surely he does not suppose that critical comment consists 
of random listing of properties a work possesses, or that 
understanding a work amounts to noting such properties 
indiscriminately. A vital part of aesthetic understanding, 
especially but not exclusively in the case of abstract works, is 
determining which among its properties the work not only 
possesses but also conveys. The significant properties of a work, 
we might say, are those it signifies. This must be taken fully 
into account in one way or another, and my way is in terms of 
exemplification. 
(Goodman 1984, 84.)
We can follow Goodman and say that understanding a work does not 
consist of noting random facts about it. It consists of grasping what it says. 
This is something that we learn when we understand the work. Moreover, 
this is not restricted to worldly facts represented, but includes also some 
facts about the work itself. It is these facts that, according to Beardsley (1981, 
530–531) himself, are the source of aesthetic value: recognizing them causes 
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us to have experiences that have intrinsic aesthetic value.7 This should also 
satisfy the toughest formalists, who insist that only the form matters in a 
work of art, not its content. The form can constitute the only content that 
the work has.
When I take works of art to say and tell things or to speak to us, I don’t 
mean that it is the artist that does these things through his or her art, 
though this may be true. I follow Goodman by thinking that it is not always 
the intention of the artist that determines what his or her work tells us. 
Neither does the work itself, independently of us, say anything. It is we who 
use works of art to tell things to ourselves. It is something in us, something 
in the way we use works of art that gives them the power to speak to us.
This being the case, there is no need to restrict these insights to art. In 
addition, even the built and natural environments can speak to us. Perhaps, 
it is art that has taught us to look at our environment in this way.
7 I said in an earlier paper that Goodman’s response is unilluminating, because it does not tell 
why the exemplified properties are the significant ones (Lammenranta 1992, 344–351). Now, I 
think that those properties may have a purely aesthetic significance in Beardsley’s sense, and 
that this does not compromise the idea of art saying things. I want to thank Hanne Appelqvist 
for this change of mind. She also pointed out that Wittgenstein may have something similar 
in mind. See her discussion of the relevant passage from Wittgenstein (1958, 166) in Appelqvist 
(forthcoming).
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